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1.  Introduction
A total wage concept includes fringe benefits and earnings-related insurance rights from
occupational and social schemes in addition to money wage. The insurance provides security
and consequently is of value not only during the time it is paid out. The individual value
varies with the risk and the benefit rules, and both the risk and the rules might differ between
different occupational groups. In this paper we analyse sickness benefit insurance rights by
calculating the actuarial value of the insurance provision for different categories of Swedish
wage-earners and estimate their importance compared to money wage, as well as for wage
differentials and wage dispersion for Sweden. Since the earnings-related insurance schemes
are mandatory and not marketable, there is a problem of valuation. This should be kept in
mind when we compare money wages with the actuarial values of the individual insurance
rights.
The Swedish sickness benefit insurance rules of social and occupational schemes are given in
the following section 2. Section 3 takes up estimation problems. Section 4 contains data and
results. We present the estimated sickness benefit insurance rights for different categories and
what the inclusion of social and occupational sickness benefit insurance rights in the wage
concept might mean for wage differentials and wage dispersion. Section 5 concludes the
paper.
2.  The sickness benefit insurance
Sweden has a national social insurance together with quasi-mandating of employer-provided
plans where the mandate is not a legal requirement imposed by the state, but the result of a
contractual agreement between labour unions and employers. Particular for Sweden is that
practically all employees are covered by occupational insurance that is elaborated in a very
few occupational schemes. There are principally four occupational schemes in the Swedish
labour market: for private sector white-collar workers, private sector blue-collar workers,
state employees, and local authority and county council employees. These cover the same
areas as the social insurance scheme and raise the level of compensation. Further, they
compensate for loss of income above the level of earnings covered by the national insurance.3
Occupational schemes depend on the social insurance system and its replacement ratio.
Belonging to a second scheme is primarily in the interest of higher income groups.
Occupational insurance schemes supplement social insurance by replacing lost income above
the level compensated for by the social insurance system. Because of the ceiling on social
insurance benefits, the replacement rate under social insurance is lower for higher paid
workers than for lower paid workers. Occupational schemes offset this by guaranteeing higher
benefits proportional to wages for employees with high career wage levels.
The employer pays sick pay during the first fourteen days of sick leave (with one no-benefit
day) at a replacement rate of 80 per cent (both below and above the ceiling). From day fifteen,
social insurance pays 80 per cent of income up to the social insurance ceiling, while
occupational sickness insurance adds a supplement. These rules are similar for both private
and public sector white-collar workers. Their occupational sickness benefit insurance has a
lower rate for earnings below the social insurance ceiling and a higher one for earnings above
the ceiling; whereas occupational sickness insurance for private sector blue-collar workers
only compensates for income losses below the ceiling. The sickness benefit of different
schemes is shown in Table 2.1.
During the first three months, the replacement rate of total sickness insurance (from social
and occupational insurance together) for private sector white-collar workers and for state and
local government employees is the same. The social insurance contribution is not risk
diversified; thus, it aims to redistribute incomes from people who are at low risk of sickness
to those who are at high risk. The occupational insurance contribution is uniform as well,
within one and the same occupational scheme. The risk of sickness differs between
individuals, due to age, sex and socio-economic group, as is shown in e.g. Edgerton, Kruse &
Wells (2000). Average sick leave incidence rates, which can be interpreted as the probability
of being absent in a specific week, are described for the periods 1987-91, 1992-93, 1994-97
and 1998-99, the periods chosen so as to reflect the main changes in the sickness benefit
insurance scheme.
3 Table 2.2 shows that the sick rate is much higher for women than for men
and increases with age. Table 2.3 shows the differences in sickness leave between
socioeconomic groups, which is higher for blue-collar workers than for white-collar workers
and higher for lower level white-collar workers than for upper level white-collar workers.4
3.  Estimation problems
Our purpose is to estimate the actuarial value of the insurance provision for wage earners of
various characteristics. To this end we need information on sickness risks or on sickness
behaviour; the extent to which individuals are absent from work referring to health problems.
Official statistics indicate that average sickness behaviour varies considerably between
different employment groups and for different years. The proportion of privately employed
workers absent from work due to illness, for example, was halved 1990 to 1995 from about 6
to about 3 per cent (Statistics Sweden, serie Am 63), compare also tables 2.2-2.3. That this
drop is related to changes in the unemployment ratio, rising from only 1.6 per cent 1990 to
7.7 per cent 1995, and changes in the sickness compensation schemes seems obvious. From
1987 to 1
st March 1991 sickness benefits were very generous with full compensation already
from the first day. 1991 the replacement rate from social insurance was reduced and in the
following years changed a number of times for different days in the sickness period. From
1992 sick pay was introduced, that is compensation for the first 14 days in a sickness period
(in 1997 the first 28 days), was taken over by the employer from the social insurance. The
first day become a no-benefit day 1993.
Before 1992 all sickness compensation was administered by the National social insurance
board and therefore centrally registered, but from 1992 and onwards data on short periods are
difficult and costly to obtain, thus also data on total sickness are difficult to compile. These
problems hold for the number of sickness days as well as for sickness compensation.
Employers provide data for taxation, which offers a source for register-based research, but
sickness compensation is taxable and included in labour income in the registers.
While we are mainly interested in the benefit systems of recent years, our calculations are
based on 1990 data where all compensation is recorded centrally. For the compensation
scheme of 1995
4 (table 2.1) we see that the daily compensation rate varies with the length of
the sickness period. From this aspect there are four different parts of a longer period; day 1,
days 2-14, 15-90 and 91-. To estimate yearly compensation a model describing the number of
                                                                                                                                                                                    
3 The presentation is based on Labour Force Survey (AKU) data, roughly 14,000 individuals. The individual is
asked about her/his activities in a certain week. If employed, the person is asked about contracted time and
actually worked time. If absent, the reason for absence is asked.5
sickness days in different parts of the sickness periods is desirable. Ultimately we would also
like the model to account for different individual characteristics and the effects on sickness
behaviour of changes in the compensation scheme.
Instead of pursuing such a complex and difficult modelling task we will follow a much
simpler path, partly dictated by the data available to us. The strategy is to non-parametrically
estimate sickness behaviour for different groups, calculate the benefits under different
assumptions of short- and long-term sickness and examine the sensitivity to some changes in
sickness behaviour.
4.  Data and results
4.1.  1990 sickness benefits.
The data used emanate from the large database for labour market analysis at the Swedish
Trade Union Research Institute (FIEF). This database, compiled in co-operation with
Statistics Sweden, contains information on all individuals participating in the labour force
surveys 1990-1995, in total just over 200 000 individuals, with register information from the
tax authorities, the Labour Market Administration and the National Social Insurance Board
for the years 1990 to 1997.
We analyse those employed 1990 with an earnings related income above the threshold for
income taxation (SEK 10000). This leaves us with 141 699 individuals with values also for
the sector and class variables. How these individuals are distributed by sex, age group (18-27,
28-40, 41-50, 51-64), class (blue- and white collars according to the SEI classification) and
sector (private, state, local authority and county council) is found in table 4.1;
5 the smallest
group has 906 members.
There is no information on sickness periods or even sickness days in our data, but utilising the
full compensation rate for 1990 and data on labour income, LI, (net of social benefits) and
data on total sickness benefits received, SB, the number of sickness days is estimated as
                                                                                                                                                                                    
4 The choice of the benefit systems of 1995 for analysis is due to our earlier analysis of other benefit systems for
this year (see Selén & Ståhlberg 2001).
5 The number of days with sick leave is larger in the north of Sweden than in the south of Sweden (see SOU
2000:72). However, we do not consider differences in regions here.6
365×SB/(LI+SB).
It is not possible, however, to say anything on the number of sickness periods, and we do not
know the number of days spent as the first day, or the first week, in the sickness periods, for
example. Even for individuals with a smaller number of sick days we cannot say that these
days belong to shorter sick periods since a period may start in the previous year and end in the
following year.
What we can do is to calculate the benefits under some different assumptions on the lengths
of the sickness periods and discuss the probable effects of estimated differences in incidence
rates and reactions to changes in the compensation obtained in a couple of studies.
Specifically we will examine the “limiting” cases of 1) all days belonging to one long period
during the year only and 2) all days stemming from a number of short periods no longer than
14 days. The consequences of periods starting or ending in adjacent years are ignored.
Observed sickness benefits for 1990 are summarised in table 4.2, calculated as the per cent of
total income 100×SB/(LI+SB) and averaged over the individuals in each cell. The average for
all is about 7 per cent; female blue collars in the private sector show the highest percentage
12.4 while male white collars in the state sector show only 2.9. Generally the percentage for
women is higher than for men. As regards the age groups the percentage is lower for those 18-
27 and 41-50 than for those 28-40 and 51-64. The relative compensation is higher for blue
collars than for white collars and the percentage is lower for those in the state sector than in
the two other sectors.
4.2. Simulated benefits for the 1995/2001 scheme.
To estimate benefits at the 1990 sickness level for the 1995/2001 compensation scheme we
proceed as follows. First the distributions of estimated sickness days are computed for
different employment categories, sex by age group by sector by class, in all 48 groups.
Results are given in table 4.3, showing the average total number of days, the percentage of
individuals with no sick days, 1 day, 2-7, 8-14, 15-28, 29-59, 60-89, 90-179 and 180- days
respectively, as well as the averages within these days’ categories. The grouping of days is
related to the changes in the compensations schemes during the nineties. In the table we see,
for example, that the average is highest for blue-collar women 51-64 years of age in the7
private sector, with 47.6 days, and lowest for white-collar men in the state sector 18-27 years,
with 5.8 days.
Using these distributions, sickness compensation is calculated under different assumptions on
sick periods. Sickness compensation is identically imputed to all individuals within each
group, thus no extra variation due to stochastic simulation is introduced. Let us first assume
that all days belong to one period only, case 1. For an individual in the first group in table 4.3,
blue collar men 18-27 in the private sector as an example, we consider him to have no
sickness days with probability 0.217, one day with probability 0.011, two to seven days with
probability 0.198 an so on. Benefits are computed separately for all these day categories,
using the average number of days in each category as the number of sickness days. Thus
benefits for one day (average one day), two to seven days (average 4.5 days, consequently a
4.5 day period), eight to fourteen days (average 10.8 and a 10.8 day period) and so on are
calculated. Thereafter these different benefits are summed using the category probabilities as







s sg p m b SB ) ( ,
where SB
sg is the resulting average benefit, k identifies the day categories, b
s( ) defines the
benefit system for sector s, while  p and m denote the category probabilities and averages
respectively.
This procedure is better than a direct calculation of benefits using the yearly average of days
only (20.6 for our example) in which case the design of the benefit scheme for the days above
the average has no influence at all. Compared to stochastic simulation of days individually
from the estimated distribution, which we also have tried, the approach here gives similar
result on the average but there is no extra stochastic variation introduced. For case 2 of short
periods an assumption regarding the number of no-benefit days or the number of sickness
periods
6 is required. We will simply assume that there are 5 no-benefit days with the
restriction that the number of such days never exceeds 50 per cent of the total number of days
for an individual.
                                                          
6 In the benefit scheme there is a ceiling of 10 no-benefit days for a twelve-month period. A new sickness period
starting within 5 days after the end of a previous period is regarded as a continuation of that period.8
The results for one long period are shown in table 4.4 and the results for short periods only in
table 4.5. The averages in these and in the following tables are calculated from
100×SBi/(LI+SB),
where  SBi  is the estimated actuarial value totally or for a specific benefit system. For the
short periods simulation in table 4.5 the average percentage is 5.0, that is about 71 per cent of
the average 7.0 for the full compensation scheme in table 4.2. The long period average in
table 4.4 is a bit higher, 5.8 or almost 83 per cent of the full compensation average. A
decrease can be expected  since 1995/2001 sickness benefit rules are far less favourable than
the 1990 rules.
In contrary to the short periods simulation the long period averages here will vary relatively a
full compensation, according to the differences in the compensation scheme for those in
different sectors and with different income. To look a bit closer at these differences we give
the compensation averages according to the different compensation sources: sick pay, social
insurance and occupational insurance. For the short periods case only sick pay gives
compensation, thus no further results are needed there.
Results are shown in tables 4.6 to 4.8 for long periods. We find in table 4.6 that social
insurance is most important with an average of 4.0, that is just above two thirds of the total
compensation of 5.8 per cent. The average is lowest for state white-collars 18-27 with 1.0 and
highest for blue-collar women in the private sector, 8.0 per cent.  The total for these women is
10.4 in table 4.4, while the total for the 1.0 group is 2.2 per cent, so there are large differences
regarding the relative importance of the social insurance in this simulation.
As regards sick pay, table 4.8, results for the groups are more similar; the average for all is
1.4 per cent. The lowest average is obtained for white-collar men 0.9, while the level of blue-
collar women and young blue-collars in the local sector is about 1.8 per cent. The
compensation from the occupational schemes is least important, table 4.7, with an average of
only 0.3 per cent for all. Old blue collars 51-64 obtain an average of 0.5 while the level for
young white-collars in the state sector is 0.1 only. When we compare the importance of the
occupational schemes, calculated as the percentage of the occupational average to the total
average, a relative weight of 4 (young blue-collar, state) to 9 (white-collar men, local) per
cent is obtained.9
4.3. Effects of changes in sickness behaviour.
In order to get a better understanding for 1995 we have to discuss changes in sickness
behaviour from 1990. As has been indicated in section 2, sickness 1995 is almost halved as
compared to 1990 and as measured by the percentage absent from work due to sickness
during a smaller time period.  Also other indicators show a definite decrease in the
population, for example the number of sick periods of different lengths ended during the year
(National Social Insurance Board). The periods 30-89 days decrease by 40 per cent, periods
90-179 days decrease by 25 per cent while there are minor increases for longer periods.
Lacking is information on shorter periods, which makes conclusions incomplete. The risk
populations for the two years are also different. The rising unemployment is important here,
probably resulting in a healthier working force and less sickness independently of the less
favourable compensation schemes.
International reviews of labour supply studies show that women would change their sick leave
behaviour more than men if the level of compensation provided by sickness benefit insurance
were lowered (Blundell & MaCurdy 1999). In Henrekson et. al. (2001) the sick leave
behaviour of Swedish women is found to be more sensitive to economic incentives than that
of Swedish men. In Johansson and Palme (1996) and Johansson and Brännäs (1996) the price
elasticity is higher for Swedish men than for Swedish women while the income elasticity is
higher for women than for men. As regards differences across socio-economic groups
Edgerton et. al. (1999) indicate that the introduction of a no benefit day affected other age-
groups more than the middle aged, manufacturing employees more than other employees,
lower white collars more than other classes and permanent employees more than temporary
employees.
Lacking more definite results and considering the scarce information on sickness periods we
are satisfied to examine two simple changes in sickness behaviour. In experiment 1 we cut the
probabilities of just a few sickness days by halving the percentages in table 4.2 for 1, 2-7, and
8-14 days and transferring the corresponding probability mass to 0 days. This experiment
recognises a cut in sickness days somewhat related to the demand of a physicians certificate
from the eighth day in a sick period. The effect on the average number of sick days for all is a
modest reduction from 25.8 to 24.5.10
In a second experiment all sickness 90 days and above is halved by reducing the number of
individuals above this threshold. Technically their weights are halved. The total average
decreases to 18.4 from 25.8 sickness days.
The results are shown in tables 4.9 and 4.10 for experiment 1, for one long period and for
short periods only, as before. We find a general decrease from 5.8 to 5.5 for one long period
and from 5.6 to 5.3 for short periods only in experiment 1, thus relatively small reductions.
For experiment 2 and long periods the reductions are much larger from 5.8 to 3.9, see table
4.11.
4.4 Wage inequality.
In table 4.12 averages and coefficients of variation for all summarise the distributional effects
of sickness benefits and sickness insurance rights. We see that the addition of sickness
benefits reduces wage inequality with about 10 per cent, with a further reduction when
insurance rights are added. As regard the different insurance schemes the dispersion is
relatively much larger for the occupational scheme (CV 165.3) than for social insurance
(56.8) or sick pay (40.4). These coefficients apply for 1990 sickness, 1995 system and a long
sickness period. In the appendix, table A4.6, we show the dispersion within the description
groups as regards benefit rights in per cent of total income for this simulation.
Overall dispersion here is larger for all than in the subgroups, it is larger for white-collars
than for blue-collars, lower for local employees than for the other groups, higher for men than
for women and higher for young than for the other age groups.
In table 4.13 and 4.14 we show the results of multivariate descriptions of wages and wage
ratios. For the factors used earlier, class, sector, sex and age group, the coefficient show the
differences between the factors on the average holding the other factors constant. The
reference category is the last within each factor and the coefficients show the differences to
that category. The reference group, whose level is estimated by the intercept, is privately
employed, white-collar, women, aged 51-64. The estimates are calculated by least squares
and the observations are weighted according to the sampling probabilities, as for all our
analysis.11
The R-squared fit is about 0.30 for wages and over 0.80 for the wage ratios, the latter
depending on the fixed imputation of sickness risks within our analysis groups. A stochastic
imputation results in R-squares below 0.05.
The columns in the tables show coefficient estimates for the different wages variables and
wage ratios. With our large sample all estimates are statistically significant. For wages with
and without benefits there are large differences between classes, the average blue-collar wage
is about 40 000 SEK below the average white-collar, between sexes with the average for men
more than 55 000 SEK above the average for women. Wages are increasing with age with the
exception that the average for those 41-50 is above the average for those 51-64.
The ratio of the extended wage measure to the money wage for the different insurance
provisions are shown in table 4.14. There are some differences among the compensation
schemes, such as a positive effect for state employees for the occupational and sick pay
schemes, but a negative effect for social insurance. Sector effects are smaller though then
class, sex and age effects. For sick pay the levels are higher for the youngest groups as
compared to the older ones, whereas the differences are the opposite for the occupational and
social insurance schemes.
5.  Concluding remarks
Earnings-related sickness benefit rights are a form of labour compensation. The average
money value of the sickness benefit rights of social and occupational insurance schemes in
Sweden is estimated at 5.0-5.8 per cent of the money wage for the 1995/2001 scheme and
1990 sickness. The percentage differs between occupational groups. The average sickness
benefit rights for private blue-collar workers is 7.4 per cent of the money wage, for private
white-collar workers 3.4, for state employees 4.2, and for local authority and county council
employees 6.6 per cent. The sickness benefit rights are highest for blue-collar women in the
private sector, around 10 per cent of the money wage, and lowest for state white-collars 18-27
years old, around 2 per cent. The inclusion of sickness benefit insurance rights in the wage
concept reduces wage inequality with about 10 per cent. The dispersion is relatively much
larger for the occupational scheme than for social insurance and sick pay. It is larger for12
white-collars than for blue-collars, lower for local employees than for other groups, higher for
men than for women and higher for young than for the other age groups.
The post 1990 sickness has decreased. Some simulations indicate that the average money
value of the sickness rights is below 4 per cent 1995.
If occupational insurance would offer all sickness benefits, then the contribution rate would
differ between the occupational insurance schemes, given the current replacement rates. The
contribution rate would then be much higher for blue-collar workers than for white-collar
workers. This would result in higher costs for the employer for blue-collar workers than for
white-collar workers compared to the current situation with social insurance. In a perfectly
efficient labour market this difference in costs would have a direct impact on wage formation,
i.e. the cost differentials for sick leave would be fully reflected in wage differentials between
blue-collar workers and white-collar workers. Since women dominate among local authority
and county council employees, wage differences between employees in this sector and the
other sectors would, ceteris paribus, also increase.13
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20 and 30 base
amounts.
Social insurance:






80 per cent on
portions of wages
between 7.5 and 30
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80 per cent on
portions of wages
between 7.5 and 30
base amounts.
                                                          
7 The base amount is an artificial amount constructed in order to make benefits inflation-indexed. One base
amount is about 20 per cent of an average industrial worker’s wage before taxes.15
Table 2.2
Sick leave incidence rate by sex and age. 1987-1999. Per cent.
Period Sex Age 20-24 Age 40-44 Age 50-54 Age 60-64 All
1987-91 Men 6.1 7.1 10.2 13.5 7.9
Women 8.6 10.0 12.3 14.0 9.7
All 7.3 8.6 11.3 13.7 8.8
1992-93 Men 4.2 5.2 7.5 12.1 5.8
Women 4.8 8.2 10.2 16.9 8.0
All 4.5 6.8 8.9 14.6 6.9
1994-97 Men 2.3 3.7 5.2 7.7 4.2
Women 3.9 6.2 8.2 7.9 6.2
All 3.1 5.0 6.8 7.8 5.2
1998-99 Men 2.7 2.9 3.8 9.9 3.6
Women 3.9 6.2 7.5 9.2 5.9
All 3.2 4.6 5.7 9.5 4.8
Source: Edgerton, Kruse & Wells (2000), Table 4.
Table 2.3
Sick leave incidence rate by socio-economic group during the 90s.
Category 1990-91 1992-93 1994-97 1998-99
Blue-collar
workers
10.9 8.3 6.6 6.1
Lower white-
collar workers
7.2 6.3 4.4 4.4
Upper white-
collar workers
5.0 3.3 2.8 2.2
All 8.9 7.0 5.2 4.8
Source: Edgerton, Kruse & Wells (2000), Table 5.16
Table 4.1
Number of individuals by sex, age group, class and sector.
Sex Age
Men Women 18-27 28-40 41-50 51-64 All
Class Sector
Blue-col State   3015   1731     966   1562   1312     906    4746
Local   3394 18623   5351   7038   5222   4406  22017
Private 32650 14032 14924 13853 10010   7895  46682
All 39059 34386 21241 22453 16544 13207  73445
White-col Sector
State   5349   4886   1132   3202   3425   2476  10235
Local   5627 15467   2081   7562   6908   4543  21094
Private 21022 15903   6622 11998 11099   7206  36925
All 31998 36256   9835 22762 21432 14225  68254
Sector
State   8364   6617   2098   4764   4737   3382  14981
Local   9021 34090   7432 14600 12130   8949  43111
Private 53672 29935 21546 25851 21109 15101  83607
All 71057 70642 31076 45215 37976 27432 141699
Table 4.2
Sickness total benefits 1990, average percentage of total income.
Sex Age
Men Women 18-27 28-40 41-50 51-64 All
Class Sector
Blue-col State 5.8   8.1   5.4   6.4 6.6   8.3   6.7
Local 8.1 10.4 10.1 10.2 8.8 10.9 10.0
Private 7.3 12.4   7.3   8.8 9.1 11.3   8.8
All 7.3 11.1   7.9   9.1 8.8 11.0   9.1
White-col Sector
State 2.9   5.8   2.7   4.1 3.9   5.7   4.3
Local 4.0   6.6   6.6   6.4 4.5   6.8   5.9
Private 3.1   5.6   4.2   4.0 3.3   5.7   4.2
All 3.2   6.0   4.5   4.8 3.8   6.0   4.7
Sector
State 3.9   6.4   4.0   4.8 4.7   6.4   5.0
Local 5.5   8.6   9.1   8.2 6.3   8.8   8.0
Private 5.7   8.8   6.4   6.5 6.1   8.6   6.8
All 5.4   8.5   6.9   6.9 6.0   8.4   7.017
Table 4.4
Simulated total sickness benefit, 1990 sickness, 1995 scheme, one long sickness period, average
percentages of total income.
Sex Age
Men Women 18-27 28-40 41-50 51-64 All
Class Sector
Blue-col State 4.8 6.8 4.5 5.3 5.5 6.9 5.5
Local 6.7 8.6 8.5 8.5 7.4 9.1 8.3
Private 6.1 10.4 6.1 7.3 7.6 9.4 7.4
All 6.0 9.3 6.6 7.5 7.3 9.1 7.5
White-col Sector
State 2.3 4.8 2.2 3.3 3.2 4.7 3.5
Local 3.3 5.5 5.5 5.3 3.7 5.6 4.9
Private 2.5 4.6 3.4 3.3 2.7 4.7 3.4
All 2.6 5.0 3.7 4.0 3.1 5.0 3.9
Sector
State 3.2 5.3 3.3 4.0 3.8 5.3 4.2
Local 4.6 7.2 7.6 6.8 5.3 7.3 6.6
Private 4.7 7.3 5.3 5.4 5.0 7.2 5.6
All 4.5 7.1 5.7 5.7 4.9 7.0 5.8
Table 4.5
Simulated total sickness benefits, 1995 scheme, 1990 sickness, short periods only, average percentages of
total income.
Sex Age
Men Women 18-27 28-40 41-50 51-64 All
Class Sector
Blue-col State 4.0 5.8 3.7 4.4 4.7 6.0 4.7
Local 5.8 7.5 7.3 7.4 6.4 8.0 7.3
Private 5.2 9.2 5.1 6.3 6.6 8.4 6.4
All 5.1 8.1 5.6 6.5 6.4 8.1 6.5
White-col Sector
State 1.9 4.0 1.7 2.7 2.6 4.0 2.9
Local 2.7 4.6 4.6 4.5 3.0 4.8 4.1
Private 2.1 3.9 2.8 2.7 2.2 4.1 2.8
All 2.2 4.2 3.0 3.3 2.5 4.3 3.2
Sector
State 2.7 4.5 2.6 3.3 3.2 4.5 3.5
Local 3.9 6.2 6.6 5.9 4.5 6.4 5.7
Private 4.0 6.4 4.4 4.6 4.3 6.3 4.8
All 3.8 6.1 4.8 4.9 4.2 6.1 5.018
Table 4.6
Simulated social insurance sickness benefits, 1995 scheme, 1990 sickness, one long period, average
percentages of total income.
Sex Age
Men Women 18-27 28-40 41-50 51-64 All
Class Sector
Blue-col State 3.1 4.7 2.8 3.4 3.8 5.1 3.7
Local 4.8 6.4 6.1 6.2 5.3 7.0 6.1
Private 4.2 8.0 4.1 5.2 5.6 7.4 5.3
All 4.1 7.0 4.5 5.4 5.4 7.1 5.5
White-col Sector
State 1.2 3.1 1.0 1.9 1.9 3.1 2.1
Local 2.0 3.7 3.6 3.6 2.2 3.9 3.2
Private 1.4 3.0 2.0 1.9 1.5 3.2 2.1
All 1.5 3.3 2.2 2.5 1.8 3.4 2.4
Sector
State 1.9 3.5 1.8 2.4 2.4 3.6 2.6
Local 3.0 5.2 5.4 4.8 3.5 5.4 4.7
Private 3.1 5.4 3.4 3.7 3.5 5.4 3.9
All 2.9 5.1 3.8 3.9 3.4 5.2 4.0
Table 4.7
Simulated occupational benefits, 1995 scheme, 1990 sickness, one long period, average percentages of
total income.
Sex Age
Men Women 18-27 28-40 41-50 51-64 All
Class Sector
Blue-col State 0.3 0.4 0.2 0.3 0.3 0.4 0.3
Local 0.4 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.4 0.5 0.4
Private 0.3 0.5 0.3 0.4 0.4 0.5 0.4
All 0.3 0.5 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.5 0.4
White-col Sector
State 0.2 0.3 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.4 0.2
Local 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.2 0.4 0.3
Private 0.2 0.3 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.4 0.2
All 0.2 0.3 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.4 0.3
Sector
State 0.2 0.3 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.4 0.3
Local 0.3 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.3 0.4 0.4
Private 0.3 0.4 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.4 0.3
All 0.3 0.4 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.4 0.319
Table 4.8: Simulated sick pay benefits, 1995 scheme, 1990 sickness, one long period.
Sex Age
Men Women 18-27 28-40 41-50 51-64 All
Class Sector
Blue-col State 1.4 1.7 1.5 1.6 1.4 1.5 1.5
Local 1.6 1.8 1.9 1.8 1.7 1.7 1.8
Private 1.6 1.8 1.7 1.7 1.5 1.6 1.7
All 1.6 1.8 1.7 1.7 1.6 1.6 1.7
White-col Sector
State 0.9 1.4 1.1 1.2 1.1 1.2 1.1
Local 1.0 1.5 1.6 1.5 1.2 1.3 1.4
Private 0.9 1.4 1.3 1.1 0.9 1.1 1.1
All 0.9 1.4 1.3 1.2 1.0 1.2 1.2
Sector
State 1.1 1.5 1.3 1.3 1.2 1.3 1.3
Local 1.2 1.7 1.8 1.6 1.4 1.5 1.6
Private 1.3 1.6 1.6 1.4 1.2 1.4 1.4
All 1.3 1.6 1.6 1.5 1.3 1.4 1.4
Table 4.9
Simulated total sickness benefits, 1995 scheme, 1990 sickness with short sickness halved, one long period.
Sex Age
Men Women 18-27 28-40 41-50 51-64 All
Class Sector
Blue-col State 4.5 6.5 4.2 5.1 5.3 6.6 5.3
Local 6.5 8.4 8.2 8.3 7.1 8.9 8.1
Private 5.8 10.2 5.9 7.1 7.3 9.2 7.1
All 5.8 9.0 6.4 7.3 7.1 8.9 7.3
White-col Sector
State 2.1 4.6 1.9 3.1 2.9 4.5 3.3
Local 3.0 5.2 5.2 5.0 3.4 5.4 4.6
Private 2.3 4.4 3.2 3.0 2.5 4.5 3.2
All 2.4 4.7 3.4 3.7 2.9 4.8 3.6
Sector
State 3.0 5.1 3.0 3.7 3.6 5.0 3.9
Local 4.3 6.9 7.4 6.6 5.0 7.1 6.4
Private 4.4 7.1 5.0 5.2 4.8 7.0 5.4
All 4.3 6.8 5.5 5.5 4.7 6.8 5.520
Table 4.10
Simulated total sickness benefits, 1995 scheme, 1990 sickness with short sickness halved, shorter periods.
Sex Age
Men Women 18-27 28-40 41-50 51-64 All
Class Sector
Blue-col State 4.0 5.8 3.7 4.4 4.7 6.0 4.7
Local 5.8 7.5 7.3 7.4 6.4 8.0 7.3
Private 5.2 9.2 5.1 6.3 6.6 8.4 6.4
All 5.1 8.1 5.6 6.5 6.4 8.1 6.5
White-col Sector
State 1.9 4.0 1.7 2.7 2.6 4.0 2.9
Local 2.7 4.6 4.6 4.5 3.0 4.8 4.1
Private 2.1 3.9 2.8 2.7 2.2 4.1 2.8
All 2.2 4.2 3.0 3.3 2.5 4.3 3.2
Sector
State 2.7 4.5 2.6 3.3 3.2 4.5 3.5
Local 3.9 6.2 6.6 5.9 4.5 6.4 5.7
Private 4.0 6.4 4.4 4.6 4.3 6.3 4.8
All 3.8 6.1 4.8 4.9 4.2 6.1 5.0
Table 4.11
Simulated total sickness benefits, 1995 scheme, those with long sickness 1990 halved in number, one long
period.
Sex Age
Men Women 18-27 28-40 41-50 51-64 All
Class Sector
Blue-col State 3.4 4.5 3.3 3.8 3.7 4.5 3.8
Local 4.5 5.6 5.6 5.5 4.9 5.6 5.4
Private 4.2 6.4 4.3 4.9 4.8 5.7 4.9
All 4.2 5.8 4.6 5.0 4.7 5.6 5.0
White-col Sector
State 1.7 3.4 1.9 2.5 2.3 3.2 2.6
Local 2.3 3.8 3.8 3.7 2.7 3.7 3.4
Private 1.8 3.3 2.6 2.4 2.0 3.1 2.5
All 1.9 3.5 2.8 2.8 2.3 3.3 2.7
Sector
State 2.3 3.7 2.5 2.9 2.7 3.5 3.0
Local 3.1 4.7 5.1 4.6 3.6 4.6 4.4
Private 3.3 4.7 3.8 3.7 3.3 4.5 3.8
All 3.1 4.6 4.0 3.9 3.3 4.4 3.921
Table 4.12
Averages and coefficient of variation (CV, per cent) different income variables and ratios. (SEK
hundreds), n=141 699.
Variable Mean CV
Money wage 1386 55.0
Money wage and 1990 sickness benefits 1468 50.2
Money wage and sickness benefit
insurance rights, long sickness period
1545 48.9
Money wage and sickness benefit
insurance rights, short sickness periods
1525 48.9
Total sickness insurance rights, long
sickness period
76.7 50.1
Sick pay rights, long sickness period 19.8 40.4
Occupational sickness benefit insurance
rights, long sickness period
5.2 165.3
Social insurance sickness benefit rights,
long sickness period
51.7 56.8
Ratio of the total wage to the money wage 5.8 44.6
Ratio of money wage plus occupational
insurance rights to the money wage
0.3 55.7
Ratio of the money wage plus social
insurance rights to the money wage
4.0 55.1
Ratio of the money wage plus sick pay
rights to the money wage
1.4 23.222
Table 4.13
A regression description of wage differentials for different wage concepts (money wage without and with
social and occupational sickness benefit insurance rights, respectively, in hundreds SEK). Regression
coefficients and R-squared.
Money wage Total wage
Intercept 1524 1620
Sector State     44     35
Local    -47    -50
Private       0       0
Class Blue-collar  -430  -398
White-collar       0       0
Sex Men   571   563
Women       0       0
Age 18-27  -412  -463
28-40  -151  -181
41-50     94     68
51-64       0       0
R-squared 0.319 0.296
Table 4.14
A regression description of the ratios of the extended wages (including the social and occupational
sickness benefit insurance rights) to the money wage in per cent. Regression coefficients and R-squared.








Intercept 106.84 100.42 104.94 101.48
Sector State    -0.10     0.01    -0.14     0.04
Local    -0.88    -0.04    -0.81    -0.03
Private     0     0     0     0
Class Blue-collar     3.88     0.14     3.23     0.50
White-collar     0     0     0     0
Sex Men    -2.85    -0.10    -2.38    -0.38
Women     0     0     0     0
Age 18-27    -2.07     -0.14    -2.08     0.15
28-40    -1.29     -0.11    -1.29     0.11
41-50    -1.88     -0.13    -1.66    -0.09
51-64     0      0     0     0
R-squared     0.894      0.801     0.867     0.91123
Table 4.3: Sickness days 1990 for employees by gender, age, class and sector. Average and distribution (the FIEF database).
 Group                 Ave-   Percentage after number of sickness days                   Average days by number of sickness days
 Age Sex Sector/       rage
             Class     days     0     1   2-7   8-14  15-28 29-59 60-89 90-179 180-      2-7  8-14 15-28 29-59 60-89 90-179 180-
18-27 M  Pr. Blue C.   20.6   21.7   1.1  19.8  18.4  18.6  13.0   3.5   2.8   1.0       4.5  10.8  20.6  40.3  72.6 121.0 259.3
18-27 M  Pr. White C.  10.1   33.2   2.5  30.4  15.9  10.6   5.2   0.9   0.9   0.6       4.2  10.5  19.8  39.8  72.4 119.9 245.8
18-27 M  St. Blue C.   17.2   24.4   3.1  26.2  18.2  14.5   7.4   3.1   1.9   1.2       4.6  10.4  20.1  39.7  73.0 138.6 284.6
18-27 M  St. White C.   5.8   40.3   4.8  33.2  11.4   6.2   3.4   0.3   0.3    .        4.0  10.2  20.6  38.6  70.9 108.2    .
18-27 M  Lo. Blue C.   20.8   26.8   1.1  20.4  15.8  15.9  12.9   2.6   3.0   1.6       4.4  10.7  21.0  40.7  69.6 117.6 274.3
18-27 M  Lo. White C.  13.9   38.6   1.3  24.4  13.8  10.9   5.9   1.7   2.4   1.1       4.4  11.0  20.6  40.2  73.1 118.2 244.6
18-27 W  Pr. Blue C.   41.9   20.4   0.7  14.9  13.1  16.8  14.6   5.2   7.8   6.5       4.6  10.8  20.7  40.8  74.7 127.5 253.9
18-27 W  Pr. White C.  20.2   19.6   1.8  27.2  20.0  14.9   8.7   3.2   3.0   1.6       4.4  10.7  20.7  39.6  74.2 128.3 256.9
18-27 W  St. Blue C.   24.9   18.8   2.3  19.4  18.8  18.8  11.7   3.6   4.5   2.1       4.5  11.0  20.3  41.3  74.3 132.1 228.0
18-27 W  St. White C.  14.7   18.2   4.0  34.8  15.7  15.0   9.1   1.0   1.4   0.9       4.4  10.8  20.3  41.8  70.6 131.0 226.3
18-27 W  Lo. Blue C.   40.4   15.0   1.1  16.7  16.0  17.3  14.8   6.1   7.7   5.3       4.6  10.8  20.8  41.9  73.8 127.5 260.1
18-27 W  Lo. White C.  27.3   16.9   1.8  22.8  19.1  16.0  11.3   4.6   5.1   2.4       4.5  10.8  20.4  41.7  74.1 126.7 264.2
28-40 M  Pr. Blue C.   26.5   21.1   1.2  21.4  15.9  17.3  12.7   3.8   3.8   2.8       4.5  10.7  20.4  40.9  73.8 125.9 267.9
28-40 M  Pr. White C.   9.3   36.2   3.2  32.9  13.9   7.7   3.6   0.8   0.9   0.7       4.1  10.4  19.6  39.3  73.0 124.8 259.1
28-40 M  St. Blue C.   20.3   15.7   2.6  30.0  19.5  15.3   9.1   3.4   2.8   1.6       4.5  10.8  19.8  39.9  74.6 127.6 257.8
28-40 M  St. White C.   9.2   32.5   6.0  34.4  13.1   8.0   3.7   1.0   0.6   0.8       4.1  10.4  20.3  40.0  71.0 134.2 224.1
28-40 M  Lo. Blue C.   30.8   19.2   1.1  21.4  14.6  18.0  12.9   4.9   3.8   4.1       4.3  10.6  20.8  41.3  71.8 126.0 267.0
28-40 M  Lo. White C.  14.0   25.8   4.6  34.4  14.8  10.5   5.4   1.8   1.2   1.5       4.1  10.5  20.2  40.0  73.8 125.5 266.8
28-40 W  Pr. Blue C.   48.4   18.0   0.7  15.9  12.9  15.5  14.8   5.6   8.6   7.9       4.5  10.8  20.8  42.3  74.3 132.9 268.1
28-40 W  Pr. White C.  22.6   24.2   1.8  26.4  16.1  13.4   9.0   3.1   3.4   2.5       4.3  10.7  20.2  40.9  74.0 127.1 265.6
28-40 W  St. Blue C.   31.3   15.2   4.6  21.6  12.7  18.7  13.6   4.2   6.5   2.9       4.5  10.8  20.3  42.2  69.5 127.4 283.3
28-40 W  St. White C.  21.5   17.4   4.3  28.2  17.1  15.0   9.9   2.6   3.8   1.7       4.2  10.7  20.4  40.3  73.7 126.1 266.4
28-40 W  Lo. Blue C.   38.9   15.8   1.1  19.7  15.9  16.5  13.6   5.1   6.7   5.5       4.4  10.6  20.5  41.7  73.3 129.9 268.2
28-40 W  Lo. White C.  27.0   17.9   2.1  26.7  17.5  14.2  10.3   3.4   4.5   3.3       4.2  10.6  20.2  40.8  73.5 129.4 259.5
41-50 M  Pr. Blue C.   28.3   29.8   1.2  20.1  13.4  13.0  10.8   3.7   4.0   4.0       4.4  10.7  20.4  41.0  73.8 126.4 274.8
41-50 M  Pr. White C.   9.2   47.5   3.2  27.1  10.0   6.0   3.2   1.0   1.3   0.8       4.1  10.3  19.9  40.9  72.4 130.3 264.0
41-50 M  St. Blue C.   22.1   24.2   3.4  27.9  14.1  12.0   9.6   2.7   3.8   2.3       4.3  10.7  20.7  41.2  75.2 127.4 259.2
41-50 M  St. White C.   8.8   35.6   8.0  34.5  10.1   6.1   3.2   0.8   0.8   0.9       4.0  10.2  19.7  39.1  71.4 132.1 237.8
41-50 M  Lo. Blue C.   28.8   25.1   1.5  20.2  16.6  13.4  10.6   4.2   4.5   3.7       4.4  10.7  20.6  41.0  74.8 128.3 267.0
41-50 M  Lo. White C.  11.3   36.5   5.3  31.7  11.5   7.2   4.3   0.9   1.4   1.1       3.9  10.3  20.1  41.2  73.2 130.6 278.8
41-50 W  Pr. Blue C.   46.0   22.2   1.2  17.3  12.5  14.5  12.2   5.1   6.6   8.4       4.5  10.7  20.7  42.0  72.9 127.5 281.5
41-50 W  Pr. White C.  16.8   28.7   1.9  28.4  14.8  12.8   7.4   2.1   2.4   1.4       4.2  10.5  20.2  40.2  72.3 130.6 264.7
41-50 W  St. Blue C.   29.4   22.4   3.1  22.2  16.2  13.5   9.6   4.0   5.2   3.8       4.2  11.1  20.1  42.1  75.7 120.2 281.1
41-50 W  St. White C.  20.8   19.3   5.0  31.3  15.5  11.8   8.8   3.5   2.6   2.1       4.1  10.7  20.5  41.5  72.8 128.1 273.7
41-50 W  Lo. Blue C.   33.3   18.4   1.7  21.9  15.7  16.7  12.0   4.3   4.5   4.9       4.4  10.8  20.5  41.2  73.3 128.9 275.4
41-50 W  Lo. White C.  18.7   20.9   3.8  31.9  16.1  12.6   8.2   2.1   2.7   1.7       4.2  10.5  20.4  40.3  73.4 129.7 276.0
51-64 M  Pr. Blue C.   38.5   30.3   1.0  16.9  11.9  12.3  11.0   4.0   6.2   6.3       4.6  10.6  20.3  41.3  74.7 134.3 285.2
51-64 M  Pr. White C.  19.0   42.8   2.1  24.3  10.1   7.4   5.3   2.1   3.4   2.6       4.2  10.4  19.9  41.6  75.6 134.0 274.0
51-64 M  St. Blue C.   28.4   29.8   3.2  20.4  14.9  10.0  12.3   1.5   3.3   4.6       4.2  10.4  20.6  41.4  72.0 142.9 283.124
51-64 M  St. White C.  16.8   37.7   3.6  26.9  10.8   8.0   6.2   1.7   2.9   2.2       4.1  10.7  20.6  41.0  72.9 119.1 254.0
51-64 M  Lo. Blue C.   40.0   30.5   0.5  18.8  11.7  11.0   8.6   4.1   7.0   7.8       4.3  10.8  20.0  41.4  77.6 131.5 253.5
51-64 M  Lo. White C.  20.4   39.9   4.8  24.5   8.3   7.6   5.9   2.3   3.9   2.9       3.9  10.6  20.5  40.1  72.0 129.3 271.8
51-64 W  Pr. Blue C.   47.6   25.7   0.9  16.9  11.3  12.8  11.7   5.2   6.7   8.8       4.7  10.7  21.0  41.9  73.5 133.0 288.7
51-64 W  Pr. White C.  24.5   28.8   1.0  24.5  13.9  12.2   9.3   3.0   4.4   2.9       4.3  10.5  20.4  41.2  72.3 135.6 261.1
51-64 W  St. Blue C.   33.4   22.3   2.1  21.6  14.7  11.7  12.4   5.0   5.5   4.7       4.5  11.0  19.6  42.8  73.0 131.8 258.9
51-64 W  St. White C.  26.5   18.1   5.0  28.1  13.3  14.3   9.5   3.6   4.9   3.1       4.3  11.0  20.1  41.7  74.3 129.0 256.5
51-64 W  Lo. Blue C.   40.2   20.7   1.2  19.7  15.0  13.8  12.3   4.5   6.4   6.5       4.3  10.7  20.3  42.0  73.2 129.0 281.7
51-64 W  Lo. White C.  27.2   20.3   3.3  28.4  14.7  12.6   9.4   3.3   4.5   3.5       4.1  10.3  20.2  41.9  74.6 132.0 278.225
Appendix
Table A4.6
Coefficient of variance social insurance sickness benefits rights, percentages of total income. Simulations
for a long sickness period, 1990 sickness, different sectors and classes, per cent. Simulations as for table
4.6.
Sex Age
Men Women 18-27 28-40 41-50 51-64 All
Class Sector
Blue-col State 16.9 10.2 19.5 22.4 14.5 8.6 21.8
Local 21.8 7.5 19.3 8.2 5.0 0.1 13.0
Private 22.6 6.0 37.0 30.9 24.9 10.9 31.3
All 23.3 12.9 35.6 26.7 21.7 11.2 27.5
White-col Sector
State 38.1 16.3 46.2 42.5 43.6 23.7 42.9
Local 25.5 16.8 23.2 24.2 20.5 13.0 27.2
Private 36.8 14.3 33.4 46.6 31.4 13.3 38.8
All 36.5 17.7 40.9 43.7 33.1 17.5 38.7
Sector
State 45.9 21.3 46.0 41.3 42.5 26.3 41.0
Local 44.1 24.6 26.8 27.8 36.8 24.8 31.9
Private 45.3 40.0 44.1 51.7 56.3 35.0 48.9
All 46.6 33.4 44.1 45.3 50.1 32.6 44.6